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1. INTRODUCTION 5
1. INTRODUCTION
The interrelation of trade and long-run growth is one of the oldest issues
in economic theory. Throughout the history of economic thought two
opposing views on the role of trade attracted attention of academic re-
searchers and practitioners. According to the first one, countries benefit
from economic integration through efficiency-improving effects of trade
on the allocation of production resources. The second view represented,
in particular, by the doctrine of uneven development emphasizes the in-
creasing divergence of per capita incomes as a result of international
division of labor and long-term specialization of countries in trade. Some
countries become losers because of unfavorable specialization impeding
industrialization and hindering utilization of positive external effects that
development might bring to less developed nations in autarky.
Generally, the problem of openness and global development includes
two different issues. The first issue is about differences in economic
performance. Does trade in goods, services and factors lead to a con-
vergence in per capita incomes or it increases a tendency for uneven
development? The second issue is about long-term welfare gains and
losses from trade. Do all countries benefit in the long run from trade in
terms of social welfare if international barriers to trade are removed?
A narrower issue addressed in this paper is about the effects of trade
on the long-run performance of a country with absolute advantages in
the extracting sectors. Will the resource-abundant country inevitably re-
main a supplier of raw materials, and to what extent can it benefit from
trade? In particular, this is an important issue from the perspective of
Russia’s economic integration with other economies located geographi-
cally close.
Economic literature does not provide an unambiguous answer to these
questions, while suggesting a diversity of "pessimistic" results. For in-
stance, the disparity of growth has been demonstrated in the "learning-
by-doing" and human capital accumulation models of economic integra-
tion (e.g. Boldrin and Sheinkman, 1988; Lucas, 1988; Young, 1991; Sto-
key, 1991). Endogenous growth models with R&D competition and in-
ternational trade in goods may display a similar property. Feenstra
(1996) utilizes the framework of Helpman and Grossman (1991) and
shows that in the absence of technological diffusion trade between
countries of different size may cause the divergence of incomes.
The ambiguity of theoretical results about interrelation of trade and
growth to some extent reflects a variety of views on the essentials of
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economic development. This process can be viewed as an accumulation
of country-specific factors of production, which make national industries
competitive in the global division of labor. The engine of growth in the
models of endogenous growth is investment in physical or human capi-
tal, and accumulation of fundamental or technological knowledge. Im-
portantly, factors like knowledge, blue-prints, and production equipment
are tradable or transferable across countries. By this reason a broader
view on openness comprising not only exchange in goods, but also in
capital, ideas, and various spillover effects of R&D may not receive a
convincing answer from many of these theoretical models. Broadly de-
fined, openness would lead to an intensive international factor migration
precluding accumulation of country-specific advantages and making di-
vergence of growth hardly possible. As was shown by Feenstra (1996),
the assumption about international diffusion of knowledge may play a
decisive role in the demonstration of convergence effects of interna-
tional trade.
In our view, accumulation of country-specific advantages is impossible
without acquisition of new skills by qualified labor.  This is, for instance,
an essential feature of development in the transition economies where
business-practices like corporate governing, marketing, book-keeping,
financial and risk management, etc had been unknown or completely
forgotten before the market reforms started.
Accumulation of skills has been treated in the "learning-by doing" mod-
els of trade and growth by Stokey (1991) and Young (1991), as an im-
provement of the average level of skills. The diversity of skills that a na-
tion possesses also plays an important role in development and
constitutes a specific factor of production, which is truly non-tradable.
Unlike ideas and knowledge, skills cannot easily spill over national bor-
ders since labor is a relatively immobile factor. By different reasons bar-
riers to international labor migration are especially pronounced for tran-
sition or developing economies. Therefore, creation of new skills in
these countries requires domestic investment or individual efforts in the
form of schooling, learning, training, reeducation, etc., which induce a
raise in the national level of economic development.
Accumulation of skills may exert a significant external effect on produc-
tion. Acquisition of skills is normally a household decision that does not
internalize completely marginal effects of new skill creation on produc-
tion and trade. Therefore, the number and diversity of skills constitute a
factor of production inadequately priced by the market. The external
effects of skill creation may, to a large extent, shape the process of
economic development.
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This view on industrial development is reflected by the model presented
here, which focuses on the long-term effects of international trade on
the resource-rich country. The model describes trade between two
asymmetric countries endowed with three primary production factors:
skilled labor, unskilled labor, and a stock of a natural resource. For sim-
plicity, all these factor endowments are assumed constant in time. The
natural resource is thus inexhaustible and the word "stock" in the case
of our model refers to the impact of "nature" on national output. The
number of skills is a time-varying endogenous factor that determines
dynamic comparative advantages of nations in the bilateral trade. Ac-
cumulation of skills in the model is a result of private investment deci-
sions made by households. To make the model analytically tractable we
abstract from physical capital accumulation.
Each economy consists of two competitive production sectors: a down-
stream manufacturing sector, and an upstream traditional sector. Skilled
labor serves in the production of the final manufacturing good. Unskilled
labor and the natural resource are used for the production of the raw
material by the upstream sector. The raw material is an intermediate in-
put for the manufacturing sector. Final manufactured goods produced in
both countries are perfect substitutes in consumption and can be ex-
changed for the raw material in bilateral trade.
The diversity of skills has a positive impact on manufacturing because
skills are imperfect substitutes in production. Horizontal differentiation of
skills plays the same role in our model, as horizontal differentiation of
intermediate inputs in the models of endogenous growth (Grossman &
Helpman, 1991). To make clear the economic intuition, we can suggest
quite a broad interpretation of skills as a fringe of differentiated inter-
mediate producer services. These, in line with Ciccone and Matsuyama,
include "equipment repair and maintenance, transportation and com-
munication services, engineering and legal supports, accounting, adver-
tising, and financial services, and so on" (Ciccone & Matsuyama, 1996,
p. 34). Understood like this, the number-of-skill model is not very differ-
ent from the variety-expanding endogenous growth models.
Household preferences and production technologies in the two coun-
tries are symmetric. The asymmetry appears only in households’ en-
dowments. One of the countries is supposed resource-abundant: it has
a larger stock of the natural resource and, hence, possesses an abso-
lute advantage in the production of the raw material. Furthermore, the
countries are endowed with different numbers of skills. Comparative ad-
vantages in trade are determined at each instant by the relationship
between cross-countries ratios of the numbers of skills and the volumes
of the natural resource.
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The country with comparative advantage in manufacturing imports the
raw material and exports the manufacturing good. The model demon-
strates that if returns on skills are decreasing, development paths of the
countries converge. Under decreasing returns the resource-abundant
country will eventually specialize in exporting the raw material, no matter
how it is developed initially. Even if it has initially a comparative advan-
tage in manufacturing and imports the raw material from the resource-
scarce country, it loses this advantage in the course of transition to the
steady state. This is a result of convergence of returns on skills to the
discount rates identical across countries.
Both countries gain from trade in the short run but the resource-
abundant country may lose from an unfavorable development pattern. It
tends to under-accumulate skills as compared to the case of autarky.
The resulting long-term effect of trade on social welfare is positive for
the resource-scarce country and may be negative for the resource-
abundant country. The latter is a loser if the external effect of skills on
production is pronounced or, equivalently, various skills are poor sub-
stitutes. The resource-abundant country gains from trade if this external
effect is insignificant.
The situation is different in the case of increasing returns on skills. In
this case economic dynamics are indeterminate: the initial endowments
of skills are not sufficient to define equilibrium paths. The long-run evo-
lution of the economy depends among other factors on self-fulfilling ini-
tial beliefs. Therefore comparison of openness regimes in our model
faces some methodological difficulties. For instance, it is not completely
clear which trading equilibrium paths are to be compared with autarky
equilibrium paths. Nevertheless, the model provides some arguments
that trade under increasing returns bolsters the divergence of growth.
The reason is that returns on skills do not converge to the discount rate
and may remain in the long run different between countries. Welfare
comparison shows that households in the resource-abundant country
gain from trade under increasing returns. They reduce consumption at
the early stage of development and increase investment in skills. The
trading equilibrium path provides therefore a higher long-run number of
skills and a higher long-run welfare in the resource-abundant country
than the autarky equilibrium path.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
model; Section 3 analyzes the autarky equilibrium, and Section 4 exam-
ines the trading equilibrium. Section 5 provides an analysis of conver-
gence and Section 6 addresses the welfare issue. Finally, conclusions
are drawn in Section 7.
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2. THE MODEL
2.1. Households
The economy is populated by infinitely living homogenous households.
The size of the population is constant over time and normalized to unity.
Households are endowed with three primary factors: skilled labor, un-
skilled labor, and a stock of a natural resource. These are exogenous
production factors that are assumed constant in time. The total number
of skills supplied by households is an endogenous production factor.
The representative household chooses a consumption path and invests
in the accumulation of skills. It does not influence production decisions
by firms and expected returns on skills. At each instant the household
inelastically supplies a unity of skilled labor and a unity of unskilled labor
to the firms.
The household’s problem is maximizing its discounted utility function
,)(
0
∫∞ δ− dtcue t (1)
subject to
,cyn −=? (2)
.0≥n? (3)
Here y is per capita income, c is consumption, δ is the discount rate, n
is the current number of skills. Equation (2) is a dynamic budget con-
straint. Creation of a new skill requires a unity of final output. According
to (3) individuals cannot sell skills that they have acquired. The instanta-
neous consumption utility u(c) is strictly concave and continuously dif-
ferentiable.
2.2. Production
There are two production sectors in the economy – manufacturing and
extracting. The final manufacturing sector is populated with homoge-
nous and competitive firms operating under constant returns to scale.
The number of firms is constant and normalized to unity. Firms select
inputs of skilled labor and the raw material supplied by the extracting
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sector. The manufacturing firm’s production function is
,1 α−α= RLy (4)
where
θ
θ






= ∫n diilL
0
/1)(
is a composite skilled labor input, and R is the raw material input. Here
l(i) denotes the labor input of Skill i, θ =σ/(σ – 1), and σ is the partial
elasticity of substitution. Skills are imperfect substitutes, σ > 1, and pa-
rameter θ ≥ 1 measures the differentiation of skills.
The manufacturing firm chooses inputs to maximize instantaneous profit:
,)()(
0
pRdiiliwy
n
−−=π ∫
where w(i) is the price of skill i, p is the raw material price.
The extracting sector consists of competitive and identical firms. The
number of firms in the extracting sector is constant and normalized to
unity. The extracting firm exploits the stock of the natural resource, N,
and the unskilled labor input, lu. The production function of the extract-
ing firm, R = f(N, lu) is homogenous.
3. THE AUTARKY EQUILIBRIUM
Suppose that the economy is closed. The labor markets clear if l = 1/n,
and lu=1. Skills enter production function (4) symmetrically, and l(i) = l
for all i. Therefore we omit here and henceforth the index of skills, when
possible. The composite labor input is L = l⋅nθ = nθ–1. Aggregate supply
is then determined by the number of skills and the raw material supply:
.),( 1)1( α−−θα= RnRny (5)
Production by the extracting firm is constant in time: R = f(N, 1).
The first-order conditions for the final good production are
wlLRL =∂∂α −α /)/( 1
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and
.)/)(1( pLR =α− α−
One can easily show that1
1−θ
=
∂
∂
n
l
L
.
Factor prices are determined as:
),,(1)1( RnyRnw α=α= α−−θα (6)
./),()1()1( )1( RRnyRnp α−=α−= α−−θα (7)
Unskilled labor is rewarded according to its share in the raw material
production. In fact, we do not need to specify this share, or the share of
the natural resource in household income.
The individual makes current consumption-investment decision by com-
paring instantaneous return on the new skill with the discount rate. By
assumption, the individual does not influence the return on skills. To de-
fine this return properly, we have to use a notational difference for indi-
vidual and economy-wide number of skills. Let n denote the former and
n′ the latter. In fact the number of skills that appears in the firm produc-
tion function (4) relates to the economy-wide number of skills. The sin-
gle skill input l and equilibrium output y(n′, R) are also determined by n′.
Hence, the return on the skill can be represented as a function r(n′) =
w(n′)ι, where ι is the individual single skill input. By symmetry of skills
and homogeneity of individuals, ι = l = 1/n′.2 The total skill premium is
w = r(n′)n, and the household income is linear in n: y = r(n′)n + pR. The
marginal return on skills is thus r(n′) = αy(n′, R)/n′. In what follows we
do not use the symbol of prime in notation of this variable.
We thus ensure concavity of the household problem, irrespective of the
kind of dependence between the marginal return and the number of
                                               
1 Indeed,
.)()()(/ 1/11
1
0
/1 −θ−
−θ
θ θ



θ=∂∂ ∫ ildiililL
n
Inserting l(i) = 1/n yields ∂L/∂l = 1−θn .
2 One can suggest a probabilistic interpretation for the single skill intensity ι. It
may be regarded from the individual’s view as an instantaneous probability of
being employed by the firm at some position corresponding to the specific skill.
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skills. The returns on skills are decreasing if
0
)/),((
<
∂
∂
α=
n
nRny
dn
dr
,
or α(θ – 1) < 1, that is the elasticity of substitution between different
skills is quite high, σ > 1 + α. The returns are increasing if the elasticity
of substitution is low, σ < 1 + α.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium dynamics under autarky satisfies the system
,),( cRnyn −=? (8)
( ),/),()( δ−α= nRnychc? (9)
where h(c) = − u′(c)/u″(c) is reciprocal to the intertemporal substitution
rate. The steady state of this system (na, ca) is unique. It is a saddle
point if returns on skills are decreasing, and an unstable spiral or node if
returns are increasing.
According to Proposition 1, the model exhibits two cases of equilibrium
dynamics. The first one corresponds to decreasing returns on skills and
reproduces the pattern of neoclassical growth. Given any initial range of
skills n0 such that n0 < na, the equilibrium path is a saddle trajectory
converging to the stationary point S = (na, ca). The equilibrium path is
drawn with bold line in Fig. 1, which illustrates the phase space of the
system (8), (9). The stationary point S is a unique autarky steady state
of the model. The saddle equilibrium trajectory satisfies any conven-
tional transversality condition. The number of skills n is monotonously
c
ac
Figure 1. The autarky equilibrium path: decreas-
ing returns.
S
O
0c
nnn a0
3. THE AUTARKY EQUILIBRIUM 13
increasing along the equilibrium path, and the constraint (3) of the
household problem is non-binding at any instant.
The second case of equilibrium dynamics emerges when returns on
skills are increasing. The phase space is depicted in Fig. 2. The station-
ary point S of the dynamic system is unstable and neither trajectory in
the phase space achieves this point.
The curve OA is a locus of zero investment such that c = y(n, R). Any
equilibrium trajectory intersects this curve at some finite point in time
when constraint (3) of the household problem becomes binding. At this
and subsequent moments consumption equals current income because
households cannot sell skills to increase consumption. The intersection
point is thus a steady state of the model under the binding investment
constraint. Households do not invest in skills in this state and consump-
tion remains constant in time.
The long-run development under increasing returns on skills is indeter-
minate. Given any initial number of skills, n0, the equilibrium path is de-
fined by the choice of initial consumption c0 among a continuum of fea-
sible values of initial consumption located below locus OA in Fig. 2.
Each equilibrium path uniquely determines a zero-investment steady
state, which is located in a domain belonging to locus OA and marked
with bold dots. Individual initial consumption is determined by the first
order condition to the household problem (1) – (3) equating marginal
c
Figure 2. The autarky equilibrium path: increasing returns.
A
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utility of consumption and the value of new skill (see proof of Proposi-
tion 1 in Appendix). The initial value of skills is, hence, determined on
social basis, and the initial individual choice of consumption depends on
individual choices by all households. This per se leaves room for multi-
plicity of equilibrium paths and self-fulfilling beliefs about long-run de-
velopment and steady-state consumption.
Point A = (na(n0, c0), ca(n0, c0)) in Fig. 2 is an example of steady state
under increasing returns determined by an initial number of skills equal
to n0 and initial consumption c0. An equilibrium trajectory starting from
this initial point is drawn with bold line. For any initial number of skills
satisfying n0 < na, the equilibrium consumption path is decreasing at the
beginning of transition. Once n exceeds na, consumption starts to in-
crease until the steady state number of skills na(n0, c0) > na is reached.
The steady-state number of skills and consumption level under increas-
ing returns is higher than under decreasing returns. Dynamics of con-
sumption is thus J-shaped: the return on skills is below the discount rate
at the first stage of development and above this rate at the second
stage. The return on skills is increasing in time and exceeds the dis-
count rate at any stationary state (na(n0, c0), ca(n0, c0)).3
4. THE TRADING EQUILIBRIUM
Consider a two-country world with bilateral trade in goods. All produc-
tion factors including skills are immobile. The countries are identical in
terms of population size, labor endowments, preferences and technolo-
gies, but differ in the size of the natural resource and the number of
skills.
Trade is free, and prices of traded goods are equalized at each instant.
Due to linear homogeneity of production, unit costs in both sectors are
also equalized, and complete specialization in production is ruled out.
The country with comparative advantage in manufacturing imports the
raw material and exports the final good. Trade is balanced at each in-
stant.
Let Xj denote the raw material input in manufacturing in country j. Here
and henceforth subscript j = 1,2 labels country. Let ∆R be the volume of
the raw material exported (imported if ∆R < 0) by country 1. Then
                                               
3 We did not analyze the case of constant returns on skills, when σ = 1 + α. In
fact, the behavior of equilibrium paths in this case is qualitatively close to the one
determined under increasing returns.
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X1 = R1 – ∆R, and X2 = R2 + ∆R. Since trade is balanced, country 1 im-
ports (exports if ∆R < 0) p∆R units of the final good where p is the raw
material price. Household disposable income is q1 = y1 + p∆R in country
1, and q2 =y2 – p∆R in country 2. We assume that country 2 is re-
source-abundant and country 1 is resource-scarce: N2 > N1 and,
hence, R2 > R1, and denote the ratio R2/R1 as ρ. This ratio determines
an absolute advantage of country 2 in the extracting sector.
The household problem under free trade is:
,)(
0
∫
∞
δ− dtcue j
t (10)
subject to
,jjj cqn −=? (11)
,0≥jn? (12)
j = 1, 2. The labor market clears in each country if lj = 1/nj, luj = 1. Like
in the autarky case, equilibrium final output in country j is
,),( 1)1( α−−θα= jjjj XnXny (13)
and the raw material production is Rj = f(Nj, 1).
The first-order conditions for profit maximization by the manufacturing
firm are similar to (6), (7) and imply that
.
)1(
j
j
j X
w
p
α
α−
=
The equalization of prices is reached at each instant through an adjust-
ment of relative wage w2/w1 and trade volume ∆R. The raw material
prices are equalized, p1 = p2 = p, if the following condition holds
.
1
2
1
2
X
X
w
w
=
Similarly, the final good prices are equalized if unit costs in manufactur-
ing:
α=+= −α−θα− /)(/)( 1)1( jjjjjjjjj wXnXnyXpwz
are identical across the countries. Note that this cost is normalized to
unity in one of the countries and equals to unity in the other. Equaliza-
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tion of unit costs implies that
.
1
1
2
)1(
1
2
1
2
α−−θα








=
X
X
n
n
w
w
Consequently, the following conditions must hold under free trade:
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
−θ




==
n
n
X
X
w
w
. (14)
These equations determine the terms of trade and the trade volume.
Proposition 2. The trade volume is
.
)/(1
)/(
1
12
1
12
1
−θ
−θ
+
ρ−
=∆
nn
nn
RR
According to Proposition 2, if country 1 has a comparative advantage in
extraction, that is (n2/n1)
θ–1 > ρ, it exports the amount ∆R of the basic
good to country 2, and vice-versa. The country with a higher number of
skills has an absolute advantage in manufacturing but does not neces-
sarily possess a comparative advantage in manufacturing. The higher
the external effect of skill creation on manufacturing indicated by pa-
rameter θ, the lower the level of absolute advantage in skills required for
comparative advantage in manufacturing.
Corollary. The inputs of raw material are
.
)/(1 1
21
−θ+
+
=
ji
j
nn
RR
X
The household incomes are
( ) ),,(/)1(),( jjjjjjjj XnqXRXnyq ≡α−+α=
j = 1, 2. As in autarky, individuals make investment decisions comparing
the return on skills with the discount rate. They ignore the effects of new
skill creation on the manufacturing firms’ production technology. They
also ignore the effects of investment on the terms of trade and the vol-
ume of trade. Therefore, as above, marginal return on the new skill
equals skill premium rj = αy(nj, Xj)/nj, and it does not include the return
on international exchange.
The raw material input Xj depends on the numbers of skills in both
countries. An increase of the number of skills in a country raises output
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through two effects: directly, through labor productivity growth, and in-
directly, through an increase in the country’s raw material input. There-
fore, unlike the case of autarky, the return on skills is by definition de-
creasing (increasing) in the number of skills if:
j
j
n
r
∂
∂
= α∂[y(nj, Xj(nj, ni)/nj]/∂nj < (>) 0,
where Xj(nj, ni) is the raw material input as a function of the numbers of
skills.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium dynamics under free trade satisfies the sys-
tem
,),( jjjjj cXnqn −=? (15)
( ),/),()( δ−α= jjjjj nXnychc? (16)
j = 1,2. This system has a unique stationary state 2,1),( =
ττ
jjj cn . It is a
saddle point with two negative characteristic roots if the return on skills
is decreasing at the steady state, or σ > (3 + α)/2.
Stable saddle trajectories in the case of decreasing returns belong to a
manifold of dimension two and converge to the stationary saddle point
),( ττ jj cn . Given any combination of initial conditions (n01, n02), an equi-
librium path under decreasing returns is determined by the choice of
initial consumption for both countries (c01, c02). If initial conditions are
such that τ< jj nn0 , j = 1, 2, the equilibrium path is a saddle trajectory of
the system (15), (16) converging to the stationary state 2,1),( =
ττ
jjj cn . We
will characterize this state in the next section.
The steady state ),( ττ jj cn  has one or none of negative real-value roots in
the case of increasing returns.4 Therefore this steady state is unattain-
able for an arbitrary pair of initial conditions. Given such a pair
(n01, n02), one cannot select a set of initial consumption values,
(c01, c02), that ensures convergence of the equilibrium trajectory to the
saddle steady state ),( ττ jj cn . As in autarky, equilibrium dynamics under
                                               
4 In fact, the necessary condition that the steady state ),( ττ jj cn  have two negative
roots is that the intercept of characteristic polynomial is positive, that is
σ > 1 + α (see proof to Proposition 3).
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increasing returns are qualitatively different due to the indeterminacy of
equilibrium paths. Each of these paths attains a stationary point satisfy-
ing zero-investment conditions qj (nj, Xj) = cj, j =1, 2. These points con-
stitute multiple steady states of the model determined by the initial
choices of consumption.
5. THE PATTERN OF TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
Incomes in the two countries diverge under autarky because the
economies differ in endowments of the natural resource. In fact, the
long-run number of skills in autarky and under decreasing returns is a
power function of the extracting capacity R, as seen from the steady-
state condition equating return on skills to the discount rate. Therefore
the divergence of growth is predetermined by the difference between
countries in the natural resource endowments. The question addressed
in this section is about the impact of trade on the divergence of devel-
opment. Does trade in goods enhance divergence, or the countries tend
to converge due to some features of economic exchange? To answer
this question we have to treat the cases of decreasing and increasing
returns separately because of the essential differences in equilibrium
dynamics. The long run trading equilibrium under decreasing returns on
skills is characterized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Under decreasing returns the numbers of skills and the
final outputs are equalized in the long run across countries,
ττ
= 21 nn ,
),(),( 2211
ττττ
= XnyXny .
The long-run consumption is higher in the resource-abundant country:
.
2)1()1(
2)1()1(
12
α−+ρ+α
ρα−+ρ+α
=
ττ cc
Proposition 4 implies convergence of the countries in terms of the num-
ber of skills and manufacturing output. Whatever is the initial difference
in skills between the countries, it vanishes in the long run. Nevertheless,
trade is sustained because the countries differ in the natural resource
endowment. The long-term trade volume is ∆R = (R1 – R2)/2 < 0, hence
the raw material input is evenly allocated between the countries:
2
21
21
RR
XX
+
==
ττ .
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The skilled labor compensations are also equalized, due to the terms of
trade condition (14). Final outputs are equalized because factor inputs
in the long run are identical across the countries. The resource-
abundant country will ultimately specialize in exporting the raw material,
no matter how it is developed initially. Even if it had initially a compara-
tive advantage in manufacturing, (n02/n01)
θ−1 > ρ, and imported the raw
material from country 1, it loses this advantage in transition to the
steady state. Country 1 reaches sooner or later a comparative advan-
tage in manufacturing and retains this position in trade forever.
Convergence of development results from the symmetry of manufactur-
ing technology and the tendency of returns on skills to equalize. These
returns tend to the discount rates, which are identical in the two coun-
tries and decrease in time in both countries. Convergence of returns is
reached through the convergence of raw material inputs Xj that change
in time as
,)1(
21




−
+
−θ=
i
i
j
jji
j n
n
n
n
RR
XX
X
??? (17)
and j, i = 1, 2.5 Equation (17) indicates that the raw material input is in-
creasing in the country with a higher current growth rate and decreasing
in the other country. Suppose, for instance, that country 1 has an ab-
solute advantage in manufacturing, that is n1 > n2, near the steady state
),( ττ jj cn . It follows that the numbers of skills across countries are con-
verging if n1 is growing slower than n2. The returns on skills are con-
verging if the raw material input X1 is decreasing (X2 is increasing).
Thus, the country with an absolute disadvantage in skills eventually in-
creases the raw material input and catches up the advanced country.
Convergence of development under decreasing returns on skills does
not imply equalization of consumption. According to Proposition 4
household consumption in the resource-abundant country exceeds
consumption in the resource-scarce country. The ratio of long-run
consumption streams ττ 12 / cc  is positively linked to the absolute advan-
tage in extracting, ρ, and to the share of intermediate input in manufac-
turing output, 1 – α.
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In the case of increasing returns the stationary state 2,1),( =
ττ
jjj cn  is un-
attainable by equilibrium paths. Besides, we cannot calculate the
steady-state numbers of skills achieved by these paths within finite time.
To examine impact of trade on growth we consider instead transition
dynamics and compare differences in growth rates between the coun-
tries under trade and autarky. We use an indicator of divergence based
on marginal growth rates:
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Here superscript s relates to autarky or trade, s = a or τ. The marginal
growth rate in country j represents the change in investment in skills
caused by a change in the number of skills in this country. Both in
autarky and trade, marginal growth rate is increasing in the number of
skills due to increasing returns on skills (marginal growth rates are equal
to social returns on skills, ∂yj/∂nj and ∂qj/∂nj, respectively, that are in-
creasing in nj).
The indicator of divergence ∆s characterizes a difference in marginal
growth rates between countries for each regime. We define that trade
favors growth in country 1 if ∆τ > ∆a, and in country 2 if ∆τ < ∆a, given
that the number of skills in each country is the same under both re-
gimes.
Proposition 5. Trade favors growth in the country with comparative ad-
vantage in manufacturing.
Proposition 5 implies that trade under increasing returns favors the
country having comparative advantage in manufacturing, thus aggravat-
ing the tendency to diverge that prevails under autarky. This is so be-
cause the returns on skills in trading equilibrium do not tend to equalize
across countries. The advanced country may accelerate accumulation of
skills and increase the raw material input thus enhancing the disparity of
growth. Such a positive feedback can work because the returns on skills
do not decrease as their number grows. The economies do not con-
verge in terms of intermediate inputs, and the numbers of skills do not
equalize as the economies tend to long-run steady states.
The indicator of divergence based on marginal growth rates ∆s charac-
terizes an extra growth capacity that the advanced country enjoys under
increasing returns on skills. The resulting long-term effect of trade on
growth depends on consumption paths selected by households in each
country. By this reason, the resource-abundant country may ultimately
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benefit from trade even remaining a supplier of raw material in the long
run. The next section addresses this issue.
6. GAINS AND LOSSES FROM TRADE
In this section we examine effects of trade on the long-run social wel-
fare. Opening up trade between the countries influences welfare
through two effects: the short-term effect on production and the long-
term effect on accumulation of skills. Production effect of trade results
from the reallocation of raw material from a less productive user to a
more productive one. By this reason trade affects positively current in-
comes in both countries, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 6. Given a number of skills, instantaneous incomes in both
countries are higher under free trade than under autarky:
qj(nj, Xj) > y(nj, Rj)
for j = 1, 2. The short-term production effect of trade is positive for both
countries under decreasing and increasing returns. As it can be seen
from Corollary to Proposition 2, income can be represented as a prod-
uct of output under autarky y(nj, Rj) and a static gain from trade ϕ(Xj/Rj):
qj(nj, Xj) = y(nj, Rj) ϕ(Xj/Rj)
where ϕ(Xj/Rj) = (Xj/Rj)1–α[α + (1–α)(Rj/Xj)] > 1, j = 1, 2. Static gain
from trade is a function of the ratio Xj/Rj with global minimum at the no-
trade point, Xj = Rj. Static gain from trade is increasing, ϕ′(Xj/Rj) > 0, for
the country with comparative advantage in manufacturing, that is, for the
country with Xj > Rj. Likewise, it is decreasing for the country with com-
parative advantage in extracting, when Xj < Rj. Any increase of trade
volume causes an increase of the ratio Xj/Rj for the former country, and
a decrease for the latter. Hence, incomes in both countries are rising
with the volume of trade.
The long-term effect of trade on development may be opposite to the
short-term effect. Convergence of development under decreasing re-
turns and production gains from trade do not guarantee that both coun-
tries benefit in terms of accumulation of skills. The long-term gains and
losses from trade are revealed by comparison of the long run numbers
of skills under autarky and trade.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GAINS FROM TRADE22
Proposition 7. Under decreasing returns on skills, the long-run numbers
of skills under trade and autarky are related as follows:
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where β = (1 – α)/(1 – α(θ – 1)) > 0. The resource-scarce country over-
accumulates skills as compared to the autarky, because τ1n  > 
an1  and
the resource-abundant country under-accumulates skills, τ2n  < 
an2 . The
resource-abundant country, hence, loses from trading with the re-
source-scarce country in terms of development. Proposition 7 also
states that the greater the absolute advantage of country 2 in extracting,
ρ, the higher the loss of this country and, correspondingly, the gain of
country 1.
Fig. 3 illustrates Propositions 4 and 7. It depicts the equilibrium trajec-
tory in plane (0, n1, n2). Point A indicates the long-run numbers of skills
under autarky, and ray OA indicates the long-run proportion of skills
such that βρ=aa nn 12 / . Point T denotes the long-run trading equilibrium.
Arrow-marked curves represent equilibrium paths under autarky and
trade.
Proposition 6 implies that the short-term effect of trade on production is
positive for both countries. According to Proposition 7, the long-term
2n
A
Figure 3. The effect of trade on development in the
case of decreasing returns.
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effect of trade on development is positive for the resource-scarce
country and negative for the resource-abundant country. Intuitively, the
resulting effect of opening up trade on social welfare is positive for the
former and ambiguous for the latter. We compare the steady-state con-
sumption for both countries in the next proposition.
Proposition 8. Trade under decreasing returns improves long-run wel-
fare in the resource-scarce country. The resource-abundant country
loses in terms of long-run welfare if σ < 2. This country gains from trade
if σ > 2, and the following condition holds:
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According to this proposition, if the elasticity of substitution σ is below
the critical value 2, the resource-abundant country incurs long-term
welfare losses from trade. A positive static effect of trade on production
is eliminated for this country by a negative dynamic effect of under-
accumulation of skills. This dynamic effect is more pronounced when
the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently small or, equivalently, the ex-
ternal effect of skill creation on production is significant. The resource-
abundant country gains from trade if the external effect of development
is insignificant, and this country has a high absolute advantage in ex-
tracting. This is seen from (18): if σ > 2, then β < 1, and (18) holds if ρ
is high.
Welfare comparison in the case of increasing returns requires criteria
for selection among multiple equilibrium paths. The question is which
trading equilibrium path is to be selected for comparison with the
autarky equilibrium path? Since our goal is to compare long-run con-
sumption under autarky and trade, it makes sense to select equilibrium
paths under different regimes with either the same terminal number of
skills or the same initial consumption.
Suppose we can choose a trading equilibrium path that ensures the
same steady-state numbers of skills in each country as in autarky. Then
the steady-state consumption will be higher for both countries under
trade than under autarky, as follows from Proposition 6. In other words,
if each country has the same long-run number of skills in trade and in
autarky, both countries gain from trade in terms of long-run welfare.
Suppose now that the trading equilibrium trajectory starts from the
same initial consumption as the autarky equilibrium path. To simplify
welfare comparison in this situation, suppose that the resource-
abundant country has a comparative advantage in extracting along the
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GAINS FROM TRADE24
whole equilibrium path. This path is compared with the autarky path
governed by system (8), (9).
Proposition 9. Suppose the utility function, u(c), has a constant rate of
intertemporal substitution, h(c) = const. Given increasing returns on
skills and equal initial consumption in the resource-abundant country
under trade and autarky, households in this country gain from trade in
the long run.
Proposition 9 is illustrated by Fig. 4 where equilibrium dynamics are
shown for country 2 under autarky and trade. The bold trajectory is an
autarky equilibrium path, and the bold dashed trajectory is a trading
equilibrium path. Both trajectories start from the same initial point (n02,
c02). The zero-investment loci are OA and OB for the autarky and the
trading equilibrium, correspondingly. The long-term welfare gain results
from two effects. On the one hand, curve OB locates above curve OA
for all n2, because for any n2 household income is higher in trade than
in autarky: q2(n2, X2) > y(n2, R2), due to Proposition 6. On the other
hand, the trading equilibrium path locates below the autarky equilibrium
path because, given n2, consumption is lower in trading equilibrium. The
),( 02022 cnc
τ
Figure 4. Equilibrium paths for country 2 under increasing returns.
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return on skills in this country is lower under trading equilibrium:
αy(n2, X2)/n2 < αy(n2, R2)/n2 because country 2 exports the raw mate-
rial, and X2 < R2. Due to this, and because h(c2) = const we have that
for any n2 > n02 the instantaneous increase of consumption dc2/dt is
lower in trading equilibrium. Correspondingly, for any n2 > n02 the in-
crease of the number of skills dn2/dt is higher when country 2 trades.
Fig. 4 suggests that economic growth continues in trading equilibrium,
while it ceases in autarky when the steady state number of skills
na(n02, c02) is reached. Consequently, the long-run number of skills
nτ(n02, c02) and consumption c
τ(n02, c02) are higher in trade than in
autarky. The intuition of this result is that, under increasing returns,
trade induces households in the resource-abundant country to reduce
consumption at the early stage of development and to increase invest-
ment in skills. Country 2 accumulates more skills when it trades, and
households in this country eventually gain from a higher income and
consumption.
Note that in trading equilibrium country 2 may stop accumulating skills
earlier than country 1. The constraint (12) in the household problem for
country 2 becomes binding at some point in time, and consumption in
this country becomes equal to income. At the same time equilibrium dy-
namics for country 1 is still governed by system (15), (16) with j =1 and
n2 ≡ n2(n02, c02). Unlike the autarky case household income in country 2
continues to increase until the steady state is reached by country 1. This
is so because ∂q2(n2,X(n1, n2)/∂n1 > 0, given that country 1 has com-
parative advantage in manufacturing.6 Therefore, accumulation of skills
by the resource-scarce country favors the resource-abundant country.
Households there continue to increase consumption without investment
in skills and thus receive an additional long-term welfare gain from
trade.
The welfare effect of trade on the resource-scarce country under in-
creasing returns is ambiguous. A positive static effect on household in-
come may be offset by a negative dynamic effect of raising the return
on skills stimulating a transitory increase of consumption. As a result,
the resource-scarce country may under-accumulate skills and reduce
long-term welfare. A detailed analysis of this problem requires numerical
simulation that is beyond the scope of this paper.
                                               
6 One can show that 0
)(
)(
)1)(1(
21
>
+
−
−θα−=
∂
∂
j
jji
j
i
j
XRR
XRX
r
n
q
, if Rj > Xj.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GAINS FROM TRADE26
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main result of the model is that the resource-abundant country can
lose from international trade under decreasing returns on skills. The loss
is positively linked to the absolute advantage of such a country in the
traditional production. The resource-abundant country gains from trade
under increasing returns on skills. Development paths of the countries
converge in the case of decreasing returns but may diverge under in-
creasing returns.
A policy implication of these results is that the resource-abundant
country does not fall into an "underdevelopment trap" after opening up
trade with advanced countries. The long-run losses from trade of this
country under decreasing returns do not depend on the initial compara-
tive advantages because initial conditions are irrelevant to long-term
specialization in trade and trade patterns. From this view, policy meas-
ures aimed at "infant industry" protection are ineffective in the long-
term perspective. The resource-abundant country does not need to cre-
ate a sufficient industrial base before starting radical trade liberalization
or to pursue a "preparatory" policy against unfavorable trade specializa-
tion through, e.g., stimulating aggregate demand or raising real wages,
as advocated for instance by Rodrik (1996). In our opinion, the state
trying to diminish long-term welfare losses from trade should care about
external effects of private investment. Households under decreasing
returns on skills over-consume as compared to social optimum, be-
cause the social return on skills in this case is below the household re-
turn. By this reason an efficiency-improving policy should aim at creat-
ing a favorable investment regime and providing incentives for
accumulation of skills.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The first-order condition for the household
problem (1)–(3) is
u′(c)= v, (A1)
where v is the current value of the costate variable related to (2). The
costate equation is
)/),(( nRny
v
v
α−δ=
?
.
Suppose that the constraint (3) is non-binding. Then (A1) implies
( ))(/)( cucuc
v
v
′′′= ?
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and the co-state equation is written as (9).
The stationary point (na, ca) is found directly from (8), (9). The charac-
teristic equation for this point is
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where ny′  = ∂y(na, R)/∂n, nr′  = α ∂(y(na, R)/na)/∂n. This is a second de-
gree equation:
0)(2 =′+λ′−λ nan rchy (A2)
having two real-valued roots with opposite signs if nr′  < 0. Hence, the
stationary point is a saddle if returns on skills are decreasing. The char-
acteristic roots are complex with positive real part or positive real-valued
if returns are increasing, that is nr′  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The second equation in (14) implies that
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Proof of Corollary. The raw material input in country 1 is
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Proof of Proposition 3. Dynamic equilibrium equations (15), (16) are de-
rived in the same way as equilibrium equations (8), (9) in the autarky
case. We will demonstrate that the stationary point S = ),( ττ jj cn  is
unique in the proof of Proposition 4. Characteristic equation for system
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(15), (16) in this point is
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Applying the Laplace theorem transforms this equation:
F1(λ)F2(λ) + F12(λ)= 0, (A3)
where
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As shown in Proposition 4, the long-run numbers of skills are identical
across countries: ττ = 21 nn . Using this fact we can calculate qii, rii, qij
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and rij < 0:
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Hence, rii < 0, if and only if σ > (3+α)/2.
Consider the term F1(λ)F2(λ) on the right-hand side of (A3). It is a
fourth-order polynomial having a couple of negative and a couple of
positive real-valued roots. This is so because each equation Fj(λ) = 0,
j = 1, 2, has two real-valued roots with opposite sign (each of these
equations is similar to (A2)). The term F12(λ) is negative for all λ < 0,
since 0)0(12 >′F . Adding this function to the term F1(λ)F2(λ) maintains
two negative characteristic roots if the intercept of equation (A3) is
positive. This intercept equals to ))(()( 2112221111 rrrrchch −
ττ . It is positive
since the returns on skills at the steady state satisfy: r11 = r22 , r12 = r21,
and −r11 > −r12 for σ > 1+α. In fact, this is the case under decreasing
returns, because (3+α)/2 > 1+α.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the steady state conditions
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From (14) the long-run numbers of skills satisfy
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This equation has a unique solution 1/ 12 =
ττ nn .
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Consequently, ττ = 21 XX , ),(),( 2211
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= XnyXny , and the steady state con-
ditions jn?  = 0, j = 1, 2 imply that
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Proof of Proposition 5. Taking derivatives yields
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where symbol ∆ refers to difference between variables related to coun-
try 1 and country 2, correspondingly. The first term on the left-hand side
of this inequality transforms to:
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One can show that
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Therefore (A6) is positive if
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This is the case if X1 > R1, or equivalently, country 1 has comparative
advantage in manufacturing.
Consider the second term on the left-hand side of (A5). It is positive if
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It is positive if X1 > R1.
Proof of Proposition 6. We want to demonstrate that
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Proof of Proposition 7. The steady state conditions 0=jc?
imply that
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1
)1(1
1
βτ−θα−τβ−θα− 


δ
α
=


δ
α
= jjj
a
j XnRn
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Hence,
β
ττ




=
j
j
a
j
j
R
X
n
n
and, from Corollary to Proposition 2 and Proposition 4,
βτβτ




ρ
ρ+
=

 ρ+
=
2
1
,
2
1
2
2
1
1
aa n
n
n
n
.
Proof of Proposition 8. Country 1 gains from trade due to Propositions 6
and 7:
),(),(),( 111111
ττττ >> RnyXnqXnq aa .
Hence,
acc 11 >
τ .
Consider the same condition for country 2:
.22
acc >τ
It holds if
),()()(
)/)1(()()(
2
1
),(
21
1
2
)1(
2
22
1
2
)1(
2
)1(
22
RnyRn
XRXnXnq
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a
=>
>α−+α



ρ
ρ+
=
α−−θα
τα−τ−θα
β−θα
ττ
due to Proposition 7. Hence, country 2 benefits from trade if
1)1(
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
)1(
>



α−+α







ρ
ρ+
τ
α−
τβ−θα
X
R
R
X
or, equivalently,
.1
1
2
)1(
2
1
2
1
1)1(
>



ρ+
ρ
α−+α



ρ
ρ+




ρ
ρ+ α−β−θα
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This can be written as
,1
1
2
)1(
2
1
>



ρ+
ρ
α−+α



ρ
ρ+ β
(A9)
which is equivalent to (18). This inequality does not hold for all ρ > 1 if
β ≥ 1, or σ ≤ 2. Hence, country 2 loses from trade if σ < 2.
Proof of Proposition 9 is contained in the elucidation to Fig. 4.
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